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1Characterizing non-myopic information cascades in Bayesian
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Abstract
We consider an environment where a finite number of players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or
adopt a trend) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is not known to the players. Instead, each
player has her own private information on the quality of the product. Each player can observe the previous actions
of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A player can only buy the product once. In contrast to the
existing literature on informational cascades, in this work players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn,
a player is chosen uniformly at random from all players and can decide to buy or not to buy. His utility is the total
expected discounted reward, and thus myopic strategies may not constitute equilibria. We provide a characterization
of structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (sPBE) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of
dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. In particular, a sufficient state for players’
strategies at each time instance is a pair of two integers, the first corresponding to the estimated quality of the good
and the second indicating the number of players that cannot offer additional information about the good to the rest of
the players. We show existence of such equilibria and characterize equilibria with threshold strategies w.r.t. the two
aforementioned integers. Based on this characterization we study informational cascades and show that they happen
with high probability for a large number of players. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the
system is revealed before a cascade occurs.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a new trend or product comes out, one cannot be certain about its quality yet. Many people together might
have a better idea about the quality, but in a strategic environment players act individually. Hence, other players’
opinions can be revealed only by their actions. This means that waiting to see what other people do might provide
more certainty about the quality of the product. On the other hand, many products or trends which turn out to
be beneficial are better to be adopted as early as possible, since their value can decay over time. This interaction
can be formalized using a dynamic game with asymmetric information and a discounted utility. Players want to
maximize their overall utility, so they might postpone their decision to buy until more information is revealed. This
generalizes the sequential Bayesian learning to a setting with forward-looking players and no predefined order of
play.
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2Sequential learning has been extensively explored in the literature, with a special focus on a phenomenon known
as an informational cascade. In two seminal papers [1], [2] the authors investigated the occurrence of fads in a social
network, which was later generalized in [3]. Alternative learning models that have been studied in the literature
include [4] where players only observe a random set of past actions, [5] where players observe the past actions
through a noisy process or [6] where players observe only their immediate predecessor. The common assumption
in all of these models is that players act only once in the game and there are informational externalities only, which
allows for easy computation of game equilibrium strategies. Some other works where all players act in each period
although are assumed to be myopic by design, include [7]–[13]. In [14]–[17], authors consider different models of
Bayesian learning where players do not observe the entire action history of the past players, but a “coarser” history.
There are also works on non-Bayesian learning models where players do not update their beliefs in a Bayesian
sense [7], [18]–[22], or do so only with some probability [23]. A survey of such models can be found in [24].
An informational cascade is a phenomenon where no player has an incentive to reveal her private information,
hence learning stops in the system. This is an interesting case of herd behavior that happens even with fully rational
players. While information cascades do not necessarily happen in all systems (see [25], [26]), they represent a
universal phenomenon in sequential Bayesian learning where players act once in a sequence that is predefined
before the game starts. In such systems, when the turn of a certain player arrives, she has no choice but to either
buy the product if it seems profitable to her at the moment or forever forgo the opportunity. Hence, it is natural to
ask whether cascades occur because this one-shot opportunity was forced upon the players. It is conceivable that if
players had the freedom to choose to wait and gather more information about the product, a herd behavior, especially
a wrong one, could have been avoided. This question provides the motivation for studying information cascades in
more complex environments. In [27], informational cascades were defined for a general dynamic scenario. However,
no evidence for their occurrence was provided.
From a technical perspective, the sequential one-shot framework is easier to analyze since players do not have to
account for how much their estimation on the value of the product is going to improve by waiting. This is simply
because players are given a single opportunity to act, and cannot wait. In this case, players form a posterior belief on
the value of the product based on their public and private signals. Consequently, the equilibrium consists of strategies
that maximize each player’s instantaneous reward based on this posterior belief. In general, one appropriate solution
concept for dynamic games with asymmetric information is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Finding a PBE
is crucial for establishing whether an informational cascade occurs. Analyzing the PBE of dynamic games with
asymmetric information is by itself an interesting field of study. Finding a PBE in a general dynamic scenario with
asymmetric information is an extremely challenging task. In [28]–[30], the independence of players’ types was
exploited to introduce a sequential decomposition methodology to find structured PBE (sPBE) involving strategies
with time-invariant domain. This characterization typically involves a fixed-point equation (FPE) over beliefs, i.e.,
over an uncountably-infinite space and thus renders the subsequent analysis of the system dynamics quite difficult.
In this paper we consider a setting with a finite number of players with no predefined order of action. An
exogenous process determines who enters the marketplace. Once a player is chosen, she is given the opportunity to
buy the product (and leave the marketplace forever) or wait and have the opportunity to be called again at future
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3times. It is clear that in this setting strategic players cannot act myopically; they have to take the future into account
since they have multiple interactions with the environment.
• The first contribution of this paper is to characterize a class of sPBE where strategies depend on the private type,
as well as the public history of previous actions summarized into a sufficient statistic, the size of which does
not increase with time. As a result, equilibrium strategies have a time-invariant domain, and are characterized
through the solution of a simple FPE. Although this sequential decomposition and the ensuing FPE reduces
considerably the problem of finding a PBE, the FPE is still quite cumbersome and does not lend itself to
analysis. The reason is that the sufficient statistic is a belief over a set of size 2N+1, and thus it is itself an
infinite-dimensional object.
• The second contribution of this paper is to show that a considerable simplification can be performed in
the aforementioned FPE. In particular, we exploit the structure of our model and show, through a series of
simplifying steps, that the sufficient statistic can be reduced to a finite-dimensional object of size that grows
exponentially with the number of players, N , and subsequently to an object that only grows quadratically
with N . This simplification and the resulting sufficient statistic have a very intuitive explanation that relates
this model to the original sequential model of [1], [2] and highlights the fundamental differences between the
two settings. This quadratic-dimension FPE equations can be solved numerically in practice even for relatively
large N . We present some numerical results indicating that more collaborative equilibria emerge in this setting
if players are sufficiently patient. In particular, players are willing to reveal their information even though
they are quite certain that the value of the product is good and they would have bought it if they were acting
myopically.
• The third contribution of this paper is to provide existence results for the solution of the FPE and to characterize
the structure of the solutions. Some properties have been proposed that apply to all of the solutions of the FPE
and the existence of a specific type of strategies, i.e., threshold policies, has been proved.
• The final contribution of this paper is to study whether informational cascades can occur in this setting. We
show that the probability of a cascade approaches one as the number of players, N , approaches infinity.
Moreover, we show that the number of players who have revealed their information before the cascade occurs
is small - which formalizes their inefficiency. This is a concrete evidence that informational cascades represent
a general phenomenon that is not restricted to settings with myopic players.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the model and formulate the game of
non-myopic players. In Section III we characterize sPBE through a FPE on appropriate beliefs. In Sections IV–V
we summarize the information contained in the aforementioned beliefs and provide characterization through FPE
with finite dimension (Section IV) polynomial dimension in N (Appendix C) and finally quadratic dimension in N
(Section V). The existence results and further characterization of equilibrium strategies is presented in Section VI.
In Section VII we show that quite inefficient informational cascades happens with high probability (for large N ).
Some numerical results are presented in Section VIII, while conclusions are drawn in Section IX. Most of the proof
of the Theorems are relegated to the Appendices at the end of the paper.
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4II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an infinite horizon dynamic game with N players in the set N . Time is discrete and the current turn
is denoted by t, starting from t = 0. At each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random to act, independently
between turns. Only a single player acts each turn. The random index of the acting player at time t is denoted Nt
(and its realization is nt).
There is a product with a random state V ∈ V = {−1, 1} where V = −1 means that the product is bad and
V = 1 means that the product is good. We define Q (v) = Pr (V = v) and assume for notational simplicity that
Q (v = 1) = Q (v = −1) = 12 .
Each player has its own private information on the product. The private information of player n is the random
variable Xn ∈ X , {−1, 1}, with distribution
Q (xn|v) .= Pr (Xn = xn |V = v) =
 1− p xn = vp xn 6= v (1)
where p ∈ (0, 1/2). Define the vector of private information as X = (X1, ..., XN ). The private information is
independent between players conditioned on the true value of V , so
Pr(X = x|V = v) =
N∏
n=1
Q(xn|v). (2)
Player n’s action at turn t, denoted by ant , is equal to 1 if player n decides to buy the product at time t and 0
otherwise. In the following we will restrict the action sets such that only player nt can buy the product at time t,
and she can do that only once.
Denote a0:t−1 = (a0, ..., at−1) and n0:t = (n0, ..., nt), where at = (ant )n∈N is the action profile. The total
history of the game at time t is
ht = (v, x, a0:t−1, n0:t) ∈ Ht. (3)
We assume each player can observe all the previous actions taken by her opponents, as well as their identities.
Hence the common history at time t is
hct = (a0:t−1, n0:t) ∈ Hct . (4)
The common history of actions provide him with additional information about the quality of the product. Together
with her private information, they form the information set of player n at time t, denoted by
hnt = (x
n, a0:t−1, n0:t) ∈ Hnt . (5)
We define bt = (bnt )n∈N with b
n
t equal to 1 if and only if player n has already bought the product at time t. Clearly,
bt can be determined recursively through the publicly observed actions at and thus it is part of the common history
of the players.
A player’s pure strategy is a sequence of functions from the information sets of the game to the action space
(i.e., a decision whether to buy or not). In this work, we consider only pure strategies. Formally, player n’s strategy
is sn = (snt )
∞
t=0, with
snt : Hnt → An (bnt , nt) (6)
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5where
An (bnt , nt) =
{
{0, 1} if bnt = 0 , nt = n
{0} else
(7)
so that any player n can buy the product only once, and ant = 0 for all t afterwards. In all the turns in which we
say that player n does not act (nt 6= n), she is compelled not to buy (“play zero”). The instantaneous reward of
player n is given by
ρn (ht) = ρ(v, a
n
t ) = va
n
t , (8)
which implies that ρ(v, ant ) = v only in the first time that player n buys the product, and 0 in any other case.
Note that for player n, the unknown variables in ht are X−n and V . Hence, we define the private belief of
player n on the history of the game as µnt : Hnt → P(X−n × V) and denote the sequence of private beliefs by
µn = (µnt )t≥0. Taking the expectation with respect to this belief and the strategies in (6), we define the expected
reward-to-go of player n as
Rn (st:∞, hnt ) = E(s,µ
n
t )
{ ∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−tρ (V,Ant′) |hnt
}
, (9)
where δ is the discount factor. Note that no more than a single term in the sum (9) can be non-zero.
The strategies in (6) are functions of xn, a0:t−1 and n0:t. While a0:t−1 and n0:t are observed by all players, xn
is only known to player n. Throughout the paper, it will be useful to decompose those strategies into their common
and private components as follows.
Definition 1. Player n at time t observes hct and takes an action ant = γnt (xn), where γnt : X → An (bnt , nt) is
the partial function from her private information to her action. These functions are generated through some policy
ψnt : Hct → {X → An} ∀n ∈ N (10)
which operates on hct and returns a mapping from x
n to an action ant , so γ
n
t = ψ
n
t [h
c
t ] and a
n
t = ψ
n
t [h
c
t ](x
n).
Note that there are only four possible deterministic gamma functions γnt : wait for any x
n (denoted by 0), buy
for any xn (denoted by 1), buy according to xn (denoted by I) and buy according to −xn. The last one is clearly
dominated by one of the other three so it is never considered. Hence, we are left with three possible partial strategies,
namely, γnt ∈ {0,1, I}. Furthermore, since every non-acting player is essentially waiting (i.e., playing γnt = 0 for
n 6= nt), in the following we will drop the superscript n and only refer to the acting player’s partial function as
γt = ψt[h
c
t ].
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF STRUCTURED PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA
A. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Our main goal is to study when an informational cascade occurs. An informational cascade is defined as a state
of the game where learning stops since actions no longer reveal new information. To do so, we first have to study
the equilibrium strategies of this game. Since this is a dynamic game with asymmetric information, the appropriate
solution concept is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), defined as follows.
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6Definition 2. A PBE with pure strategies is a pair (s∗, µ∗) of
• a strategy profile s∗ = (sn∗)n∈N ,
• a belief profile sequence µ∗ = (µn∗)n∈N ,
such that sequential rationality holds - for each n, t and hnt ∈ Hnt , and each sn
Rn
(
s∗nt:∞, s
∗−n
t:∞ , h
n
t
) ≥ Rn (snt:∞, s∗−nt:∞ , hnt ) , (11)
and the beliefs satisfy Bayesian updating whenever Prs
∗
(hnt |hnt−1) > 0. Notice that this condition includes both on
and off equilibrium paths in general. In our setting, the only off equilibrium path from the perspective of player n
is when ant−1t−1 = 0, but s
∗nt−1(hnt−1t−1 ) = 1, for all h
nt−1
t−1 ∈ Hnt−1t−1 that are consistent with hnt−1 or when ant−1t−1 = 1,
but s∗nt−1(hnt−1t−1 ) = 0, for all h
nt−1
t−1 ∈ Hnt−1t−1 that are consistent with hnt−1. In both of these situations, we have
Prs
∗
(hnt |hnt−1) = 0 and we pose no restriction on the belief updating. As will be shown in Lemma 1, in both of
these cases, the beliefs are not updated for on equilibrium actions, and so we choose to not update them even if
the actions are not according to the equilibrium strategies. The beliefs at the continuation of the game from these
points on, however, will be updated according to Bayes’ rule if Prs
∗
(hnt |hnt−1) > 0.
B. Characterization of Structured PBE
We now present a methodology for characterizing sPBE where the strategy for the acting player nt depends on the
common history only through the common belief on the variables V,X (as well as the variable Bt−1). In particular,
we define the common belief pit ∈ P
(V × XN) where pit(x, v) := P (X = x, V = v|a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t). We
consider time-invariant policies of the form antt = ψt[h
c
t ](x
nt) = θ[nt, pit, bt](x
nt), i.e., γt = θ[nt, pit, bt]. In the
following we will present a FPE for characterizing the mapping θ[·]. We first show that the belief pit can be updated
using only public information.
Lemma 1. The belief pit can be updated according to pit+1 = F (pit, γt, antt , nt). In particular, if γt 6= I , the belief
is not updated.
Proof: By simple application of Bayes’ rule we have
pit+1 (x, v) = Pr (x, v|a0:t, b0:t, n0:t+1) (12a)
= Pr (x, v|a0:t, b0:t−1, n0:t) (12b)
=
Pr (x, v, at|a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t)
Pr (at|a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t) (12c)
=
Pr (at|x, v, a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t) Pr (x, v|a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t)
Pr (at|a0:t−1, b0:t−1, n0:t) (12d)
=
1γt(xnt ) (a
nt
t )pit (x, v)∑
x′,v′ 1γt(x′nt ) (a
nt
t )pit (x
′, v′)
(12e)
Note that if γt is a constant function (i.e., γt 6= I) the quantity 1γt(xnt )(antt ) cancels from numerator and denominator
of the above expression, thus resulting in pit+1 = pit. Furthermore, whenever the denominator is zero (off equilibrium
paths) we set pit+1 = pit.
May 7, 2019 DRAFT
7We now consider the following FPE that characterizes the mapping θ[·].
Fixed-Point Equation 1. For every n ∈ N , pi ∈ P (V × XN), b ∈ {0, 1}N we evaluate γ∗ = θ [n, pi, b] as follows
• If bn = 1 then γ∗ = 0.
• If bn = 0 then γ∗ is the solution of the following system of equations, ∀xn ∈ X
γ∗ (xn) = arg max

δ
N
N∑
n′=1
V n (xn, n′, F (pi, γ∗, 0, n) , b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0=“don’t buy”
,
∑
v
vpi (v|xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=“buy”
 (13a)
where the value functions for all m ∈ N satisfy
V m (xm, n, pi, b) =
0, bm = 1
δ
N
∑N
n′=1 V
m (xm, n′, F (pi, γ∗, 0,m) , b) , bm = 0, n = m, γ∗ (xm) = 0∑
v vpi (v|xm) , bm = 0, n = m, γ∗ (xm) = 1
δ
N
∑N
n′=1 E [V m (xm, n′, F (pi, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn) , n) , b−nBn)] , bm = 0, n 6= m,
(13b)
where expectation in (13b) is wrt the RVs Xn and Bn with
Pr
(
Xn = xn, Bn = b
′n|xm, n, pi, b
)
= Pr
(
Bn = b
′n|Xn = xn, xm, n, pi, b
)
Pr (Xn = xn|xm, n, pi, b),
where
Pr (Bn = 1|Xn = xn, xm, n, pi, b) =
 1 , if bn = 1 or γ∗ (xn) = 10 , else, (13c)
and Pr(Xn = xn|xm, n, pi, b) = ∑v˜ pi(xn|v˜)pi(v˜|xm). 
Once the mapping θ [·] has been found through the FPE 1, the sPBE strategies and beliefs are generated through
the following forward recursion.
1) Initialize at time t = 0,
µ∗0 [φ] (v, x) := Q(v)
N∏
i=1
Q(xi|v). (14a)
2) For t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., ∀n ∈ N , hct+1 ∈ Hct+1, xn ∈ X
sn∗t (h
n
t ) :=
 θ [nt, µ∗t [hct ] , bt−1] (xn) n = nt0 o.w. (14b)
and
µ∗t+1
[
hct+1
]
:= F (µ∗t [h
c
t ] , θ [nt, µ
∗
t [h
c
t ] , bt−1] , a
nt
t , nt) . (14c)
the private beliefs µn∗t are generated from µ
∗
t as
µn∗t
(
x−n, v
)
=
µ∗t (x, v)
µ∗t (xn)
(14d)
The following theorem establishes that the above construction generates a sPBE.
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8Theorem 1. Whenever the FPE 1 has a solution, the forward construction described in (14) generates a PBE.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Notice that FPE 1, and in particular in (13a) is akin to a dynamic programming FPE in an infinite-horizon
stopping-time problem. There is however a significant difference: although player n is deciding about her strategy
which will lead to an action by maximizing the reward between buying and waiting, we use the equilibrium γ∗ in
the update function of the belief pi. The reason for this twist is shown in the proof of Theorem 1. This proof shows
that player n faces an MDP only if every other player plays according to γ∗, and also (and this is the important
point) if the update of pi is according to the equilibrium strategy γ∗. Hence, if these two requirements hold, the
best response of player n will give us the PBE strategies, γ∗. Therefore, we have a FPE that contains γ∗ in both
the left- and right-hand side of the equation. In other words, γ∗t is an equilibrium strategy only if it is the best
response assuming that the belief update pit+1 = F (pit, γ∗t , a
nt
t , nt) is evaluated using the equilibrium strategy.
Note that the value functions evaluated in the FPE 1 are functions of beliefs pi ∈ P (V × XN), i.e., probability
mass functions on the set V × XN of size 2N+1 which renders this characterization inadequate for analytical and
even numerical evaluations due to the infinite dimensionality of the domain of the value functions. In the next section
we show that due to the structure of the problem, these equations can be simplified considerably. In particular we
first show that the domain of these value functions can be reduced to a finite set. We then show that additional
simplification is possible. Indeed the dimensionality of the FPE is polynomial wrt N . As a final step in this process,
we show that the dimensionality of the FPE is quadratic wrt N .
IV. COMPUTING A PBE THROUGH A FINITE-DIMENSIONAL FPE
In this section we exploit the structure of the problem to summarize the beliefs pit into finite-dimensional objects.
We decompose the belief of each player on the unknown variables x−n and v and show that each part can be
updated recursively. Moreover, these parts can be summarized into an integer vector. These two facts together allow
to greatly simplify FPE 1, such that the corresponding value functions have domain Rd with d finite, and are
therefore tractable for numerical calculation and analysis.
Naturally, a player is only interested in the previous actions since they carry information about the product.
However, not every action reveals the private information of the acting player. For that to happen, the action that
the player took must be determined by her private information.
Definition 3. Define the revealed information of player n up to time t as the variable x˜nt ∈ {0,−1, 1} with the
meaning that x˜nt = 0 implies the player has not yet revealed her private information, while x˜
n
t = ±1 means the
player has revealed and the value is as indicated. Note that the quantity x˜nt can be recursively updated as
x˜nt =
 2ant − 1 γt = I, nt = n, x˜nt−1 = 0x˜nt−1 o.w. (15)
with the initial condition x˜n0 = 0. Note that x˜
n
t is a function of x˜
n
0:t−1, a0:t and n0:t, or equivalently of γ0:t, a0:t and
n0:t. We use the notation x˜t = x˜−ntt x˜
nt
t = F˜ (x˜t−1, γt, a
nt
t , nt) = x˜
−nt
t−1 f(x˜
nt
t−1, γt, a
nt
t ) to summarize the recursive
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9update of x˜t, where
f (x˜n, γ, a) =
 2a− 1 , γ = I, x˜n = 0x˜n , else (16)
The following lemma shows that the common belief decomposes into a belief on v and a belief on x. Specifically,
it proves that the private information variables {xm} are conditionally independent given v , hct .
Lemma 2. The belief pit (x, v) = Pr (X = x, V = v|hct) can be decomposed as follows
pit (x, v) = pit (v)
N∏
m=1
pit (x
m|v) (17)
where pit (v) , Pr (V = v |hct) and pit (xm|v) , Pr (Xm = xm | v, hct).
Furthermore,
pit (x
m|v) =
{
1x˜mt (x
m) x˜mt 6= 0
Q (xm|v) x˜mt = 0
(18)
and the belief on V can be updated as
pit+1(1)
pit+1(−1) =
pit(1)
pit(−1) ×
{ (
1−p
p
)2antt −1
γt = I and x˜ntt = 0
1 o.w.
(19)
Finally, the belief on V can be explicitly expressed as
pit(1)
pit(−1) = q
∑
n x˜
n
t , (20)
with q = 1−pp .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Using the above structural results for the beliefs, we can simplify FPE 1. The resulting simplified FPE is shown
in FPE 2.
Fixed-Point Equation 2 (Finite dimensional). For every n ∈ N , x˜ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N , b ∈ {0, 1}N we evaluate
γ∗ = θ [n, x˜, b] as follows
• If bn = 1 then γ∗ = 0.
• If bn = 0 then γ∗ is the solution of the following system of equations, ∀xn ∈ X
γ∗ (xn) = arg max

δ
N
N∑
n′=1
V n
(
xn, n′, F˜ (x˜, γ∗, 0, n) , b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0=“don’t buy”
,
q
∑
m x˜
m+xn10(x˜n) − 1
q
∑
m x˜
m+xn10(x˜n) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=“buy”
 (21a)
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where the value functions for all m ∈ N satisfy
V m (xm, n, x˜, b) =
0, bm = 1
δ
N
∑N
n′=1 V
m
(
xm, n′, F˜ (x˜, γ∗, 0,m) , b
)
, bm = 0, n = m, γ∗ (xm) = 0
q
∑
m′ x˜
m′+xm10(x˜m)−1
q
∑
m′ x˜m
′
+xm10(x˜m)+1
, bm = 0, n = m, γ∗ (xm) = 1
δ
N
∑N
n′=1 E
[
V m
(
xm, n′, F˜ (x˜, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn) , n) , b−nBn
)]
, bm = 0, n 6= m,
(21b)
where expectation in (21b) is wrt the RVs Xn and B′n with
Pr (Xn = xn, Bn = b′n|xm, n, x˜, b) = Pr (Bn = b′n|Xn = xn, xm, n, x˜, b) Pr (Xn = xn|xm, n, x˜, b),
where
Pr (Bn = 1|Xn = xn, xm, n, x˜, b) =
 1 , if bn = 1 or γ∗ (xn) = 10 , else, (21c)
and
Pr(Xn = xn|xm, n, x˜, b) =

1x˜n(xn) , if x˜n 6= 0
Q(xn|−1)+Q(xn|1)q
∑
m′ x˜
m′+xm10(x˜m)
1+q
∑
m′ x˜m
′
+xm10(x˜m)
, if x˜n = 0.
(21d)

The next theorem concludes this section by showing that FPE 2 is equivalent to FPE 1.
Theorem 2. If a solution to FPE 2 exists, a solution for FPE 1 can be constructed with the correspondence between
x˜ and pi given in Lemma 2.
Proof: The result follows by showing that pi can be computed using x˜. In particular, using Lemma 2, in (13a)
and (13b) we use
pi (1 |xn) = q
∑
m x˜
m+xn10(x˜n)
1 + q
∑
m x˜
m+xn10(x˜n)
(22)
and in (13b) we use
pi (xm|v) =
{
1x˜m(xm) x˜m 6= 0
Q (xm|v) x˜m = 0
(23)
Note that the above substitution makes the domain of the value functions finite since each of the N strategies is
a function of x˜ and b which are discrete-valued vectors with 3N × 2N possible values.
V. COMPUTING A PBE THOUGH A QUADRATIC-DIMENSIONAL FPE
In this section, we exploit the structure of the problem to further simplify FPE 2. This simplification results in
a FPE with value functions having domain that grows polynomially with N , and in particular as ∼ N4. However,
we only present this result in Appendix C for completeness. Instead, in the following, we present an even more
drastic simplification that results in value functions with domain growing only quadratically with N . The key for
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this simplification is the fact that the indexing of the players has no effect on the future reward a player estimates
she would get by waiting. Since x˜ contains this information, it can be reduced to the following two sums.
Definition 4. Define the aggregated state information as
yt =
N∑
n=1
x˜nt ∈ Y. (24)
Further, define the indicator that player n has revealed her private information as rnt = |x˜nt |. Using znt =
max {rnt , bnt }, define the number of players who cannot reveal their private information after turn t by
wt =
N∑
n=1
znt ∈ W. (25)
Since the value function and strategy of players with bn = 1 are evidently 0 and γ∗ = 0, respectively, we
only argue for the players with bn = 0 and drop bn from the state variables. We define the functions Ua :
X × {0, 1} × Y × W → R and U r˜na : X × {0, 1} × Y × W → R ∀r˜ ∈ {0, 1} as follows. Ua (x, r, y, w) is
the value function of the acting player n whose private information is xn = x, she has revealed if r = 1 and the
aforementioned state variables are (yt, wt) = (y, w). Similarly, U r˜na (x, z, y, w) is the value function of a non-acting
player m, whose private information is xm = x, she has revealed if r˜ = 1 with an acting player n who can reveal
her private information if z = 0, and y, w as before.
Finally, define the update functions Gr, Gz, Gy, Gw as follows
Gr(r, γ) =
 1 , if r = 0 and γ = Ir , else , (26a)
Gz(z, γ, a) =
 1 , if z = 0 and (a = 1 or γ = I)z , else , (26b)
Gy(z, y, γ, a) =
 y + (2a− 1) , if z = 0 and γ = Iy , else , (26c)
Gw(z, w, γ, a) = w +Gz(z, γ, a)− z, (26d)
with the understanding that we also use the notation Gefg to denote (Ge, Gf , Gg) for any e, f, g ∈ {r, z, y, w}.
We consider the alternative FPE 3.
Fixed-Point Equation 3 (Quadratic dimension). For every r ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ Y , w ∈ W , we evaluate γ∗ = φ [r, y, w]
as follows
• γ∗ is the solution of γ∗(x) = arg max
 A︸︷︷︸0=don’t buy,
qy+x10(r) − 1
qy+x10(r) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=buy
 ∀x ∈ X , where
A =
δ
N
Ua (x,G
ryw (r, y, w, γ∗, 0)) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1 + r)UGr(r,γ∗)na (x, 0, Gyw (r, y, w, γ∗, 0)) +
δ
N
(w − r)UGr(r,γ∗)na (x, 1, Gyw (r, y, w, γ∗, 0)) (27a)
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where the value functions satisfy
Ua (x, r, y, w) =
 A γ∗(x) = 0qy+x10(r)−1
qy+x10(r)+1
γ∗(x) = 1
(27b)
and for all r˜ ∈ {0, 1}
U r˜na (x, z, y, w) =
δ
N
E {Ua (x, r˜, Gyw (z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)))}+ δ
N
E
{
U r˜na (x,G
zyw (z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)))
}
+
δ
N
(w − z − r˜)E
{
U r˜na (x, 1, G
yw (z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)))
}
+
δ
N
(N − w − 2 + z + r˜)E{U r˜na (x, 0, Gyw (z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)))} (27c)
where the expectation in the last equation is wrt the RV Xn, where
Pr(Xn = xn|r˜, x, w, y) = Q(xn|−1)+Q(xn|1)qy+x10(r˜)
qy+x10(r˜)+1
.
Specifically, for z = 1 the above becomes
U r˜na (x, 1, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua(x, r˜, y, w) +
δ
N
(w − z − r˜ + 1)U r˜na(x, 1, y, w)+
δ
N
(N − w − 2 + z + r˜)U r˜na(x, 0, y, w). (27d)

The next Theorem shows that by finding a solution to FPE 3, we obtain a solution to FPE 2. Since equations
(27) have a polynomial (quadratic) dimension in N , this significantly reduces the complexity of solving FPE 2.
Specifically, given the solution U∗ of FPE 3 (together with φ) we construct the following strategies and value
functions.
γ∗ = θ
[
n, x˜, bn = 0, b−n
]
= φ [rn, y, w] (28a)
γ∗ = θ
[
n, x˜, bn = 1, b−n
]
= 0 (28b)
V˜ m
(·, n, x˜, bm = 0, b−m) =
 Ua (·, |x˜n| , y, w) , m = nU |x˜m|na (·,max{|x˜n|, bn}, y, w) , m 6= n (29a)
V˜ m
(·, n, x˜, bm = 1, b−m) = 0 (29b)
where note that y, w are all determined by x˜ through (24) and (25). We will show that these value functions are
solutions of the original FPE 2.
Theorem 3. The value functions (V˜ m)m∈N defined in (29) together with the strategy mapping γ∗ defined in (28)
satisfy FPE 2.
Proof: See Appendix D.
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VI. EXISTENCE AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
The FPE on y, w variables in Section V are much less complex to solve numerically. However, their more
convenient form also allows for proving the existence of a PBE as we show in this section. This is formalized in
the next Theorem.
Theorem 4. FPE 3 admits a solution with the following properties.
For r = 0, and all w,
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 1 for y ≥ 2.
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0 for y ≤ −1.
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = I for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1.
Furthermore, for b = 0, r = 1, and all w,
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 1 for y ≥ 2.
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0 for y ≤ 0.
• γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] can be chosen appropriately for y = 1,
Proof: See Appendix E.
Notice that the above strategy captures the non-myopic effect of the game. For instance, at y = 1, a player with
r = 0 and x = −1, does not buy the product because her value function is positive by not buying and therefore,
she gains from waiting (i.e., playing a = 0). But in the myopic case, her valuation is 0 for both buying and not
buying and the player is indifferent between playing a = 1 and a = 0.
The FP equation (31) might exhibit more PBEs than the PBE of Theorem 4. Nevertheless, all these potential
PBE share a similar structure, as the next Theorem shows.
Theorem 5. The following properties hold for the solutions of FPE 3 for b = 0:
• FPE 3 admits solutions that are threshold functions (from 0 to 1) w.r.t. w.
• For δ < 1, all of the solutions of FPE 3 that are threshold functions w.r.t. w, must be threshold functions (from
0 to 1) w.r.t. y for r = 0, when all other parameters are fixed. This implies that if γ∗(x) = φ[0, y, w](x) = 1,
then γ∗(x) = φ[0, y′, w′](x) = 1 for y′ ≥ y and w′ ≥ w. Further, among such equilibrium strategies that
choose not buying over buying in case of a tie for r = 1, the solutions are always threshold strategies w.r.t. y
for r = 1.
Further, for all of the solutions of FPE 3, we have the following properties:
• They are threshold functions w.r.t. y for x = 1 and r = 0, and the threshold is either y = −1 or y = 0 for all
w.
• They are such that γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0 for y ≤ −2 and all other parameters. Also, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] 6= 0 for
y ≥ 0.
• We have γ∗ = φ[0, 0, w] = I .
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• For y 6= −1, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 0 for all w (constant w.r.t. w) or can only be either γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I
or γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 for all w. It implies that by changing w and fixing other parameters, the equilibrium
strategies either do not change and are always 0, or they can change between I and 1.
• For y = −1, both γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = I and γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = 0 are always solutions for all w. Also we
must have γ∗ = φ[1,−1, w] = 0 for all w in all of the solutions.
Proof: See Appendix F.
The first two parts of this theorem imply that there exist solutions of FPE 3 that by increasing y or w, the
equilibrium strategies change from 0’s to I’s and then to 1’s.
VII. INFORMATIONAL CASCADES
In this section, we employ the results on computing a PBE to conclude that an informational cascade happens
even in a non-myopic scenario. For any given game with homogeneous players, our results allow to answer the
question whether an informational cascade occurs in the game by solving equations with a quadratic number (in
N ) of variables. All that is required is for FPE 3 to have a solution so that a PBE exists, which we know it does
according to Theorem 4. This way, we can investigate informational cascades even in large games.
Definition 5. Let φ[·] be a solution to FPE 3. Define the random variables (Ht)t≥0 with realization
ηt =
{
1 φ[rt, yt, wt] = I and rt = 0 and bt = 0
0 else
(30)
which indicates if the player that acts at turn t reveals her private information. Define the (random) time of the i-th
revealing by Ti where T0 = 0 and Ti = min{t > Ti−1|Ht = 1} for i ≥ 1. We further define the random variables
(Y¯i)i≥0 with Y¯i = YTi when Ti <∞ and Y¯i = Y¯i−1 otherwise.
The next lemma characterizes the reason why cascades still occur in a non-myopic scenario, and even relatively
fast.
Lemma 3. Let φ[·] be a solution to the FP 3. The induced process {Y¯i}i is a Markov chain where there exist
yR, yL such that for all yL < y < yR, if Ti+1 <∞ then
Pr
(
Y¯i+1 = y
′|Y¯i = y
)
=

p+(1−p)qy
qy+1 y
′ = y + 1
1−p+pqy
qy+1 y
′ = y − 1
(31)
and yL, yR are absorbing states.
Proof: First we show the Markovianity of (Y¯i)i≥0
Pr
(
Y¯i+1 = y
′|Y¯0:i = y0:i
)
= Pr
(
YTi +X
NTi = y′ |YT0:i = y0:i
)
(32a)
= Pr
(
XNTi = y′ − yi|YT0:i = y0:i
)
(32b)
=
Q(y′ − yi|0) +Q(y′ − yi|1)qyi
qyi + 1
(32c)
= Pr
(
Y¯i+1 = y
′|Y¯i = yi
)
. (32d)
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Now we characterize the absorbing states. For δ < 1 and Ymax =
⌈
1 + logq(
1+δ
1−δ )
⌉
, we have
qYmax+x
n10(x˜n) − 1
qYmax+xn10(x˜n) + 1
> δ > δUa (x, rt+1, yt+1, wt+1) . (33)
So either yR = Ymax is absorbing or there exists a yR < Ymax that is absorbing. In Yt = yR, all players, regardless
of xn, prefer to buy. Similarly, for Ymin = −2 we have
q−1 − 1
q−1 + 1
= 2p− 1 < 0 < δUa (x, rt+1, yt+1, wt+1) (34)
So either yL = Ymin = −2 or yL = −1 is absorbing. In Yt = yL, all players, regardless of xn, prefer to wait.
Hence, in Yt = yL or Yt = yR no more revealings occur and Yt (and Y¯i) remains constant for all t′ > t with
probability 1.
The absorbing states of the Markov chain we defined above are informational cascades. However, an informational
cascade that occurs after all or almost all player have revealed their private information is of little interest. The
following theorem shows that this is far from being the case.
Theorem 6. For δ < 1, the probability that an informational cascade occurs in finite time approaches 1 as N →∞.
Furthermore, let MN be a sequence such that limN→∞ MN√N = 0 and limN→∞MN =∞.
1) The probability that less than MN players have revealed their private information before the cascade occurred
approaches 1 as N →∞.
2) If, in addition, the solution is such that φ [r, y, w] = 1 implies φ [r, y, wˆ] = 1 for all wˆ > w (according to
Theorem 5, we know such solutions exist), then the cascade happens in less than MN turns with a probability
that approaches 1 as N →∞.
Proof: See Appendix G.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the solution of FPE 3. The results were obtained as follows.
First an iterative algorithm was used to solve the FPE, much like the value iteration algorithm used in the solution
of Markov Decision Processes. The iterative process was run until value functions converged numerically. In order
to verify without a doubt that this solution is an equilibrium, a second step was followed. At the second step, the
equilibrium strategy obtained by this iterative process was fixed and a linear system of equations was formulated
with unknowns being all value functions. This system was solved using infinite precision arithmetic (through rational
number representation) and the exact value functions were obtained corresponding to this strategy profile. The final
step involved checking if sequential rationality is satisfied for the obtained value functions, i.e., if all inequalities
in (27) are satisfied.
In the following we present results for N = 11, p = 0.1 and three different values for δ, namely, δ = 0,
δ = 0.999, and δ = 1. The first case (δ = 0) is essentially the case of myopic players and the results in Fig. 1
confirm the ones in [2]. Regardless of the value of w, players who have not yet revealed their information, always
wait for y ≤ −2, always buy for y ≥ 2 and reveal their information for −1 ≤ y ≤ 1. Note that for y = 1 a
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non-revealing player is indifferent between γ = I and γ = 1, and similarly for y = −1. We resolve the tie by
assuming that the player always reveals. In addition, for y = 0 a player who has already revealed is indifferent
between any action, and we resolve this ambiguity by assuming that she plays γ = 0.
Fig. 1. Equilibrium strategies for N = 11, p = 0.1, δ = 0. “00”, “01”, and “11” denote strategies 0, I , and 1, respectively.
The second case (δ = 0.999) studies more patient players and the results are depicted in Fig. 2. Not surprisingly,
players are willing to wait more before committing to a buying decision. In fact, for values of w = 2 to w = 5 and
with a believed product quality of y = 2 a player is not committing to buy (i.e., to play γ = 1) but the equilibrium
strategy is to reveal her information (γ = I). Similarly, with a believed product quality of y = 2 a player who has
already revealed her private information Xn = −1 chooses to wait (γ = 0).
Fig. 2. Equilibrium strategies for N = 11, p = 0.1, δ = 0.999. “00”, “01”, and “11” denote strategies 0, I , and 1, respectively.
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The third case (δ = 1) studies infinitely patient players and the results are depicted in Fig. 3. Not surprisingly,
players are willing to wait more before committing to a buying decision. In fact, for w = 5 and with a believed
product quality of y = 5 a player is not committing to buy (i.e., to play γ = 1) but the equilibrium strategy is to
reveal her information (γ = I). Similarly, for w = 6 and with a believed product quality of y = 4 a player who
has already revealed her private information Xn = −1 chooses to wait (γ = 0). Clearly, as w increases and we
are approaching the end of the game, players become more aggressive, as there is less information to be learnt by
waiting, and at w = N the equilibrium strategies for δ = 0 and δ = 1 coincide. Nevertheless, in the case of patient
players a more cooperative equilibrium emerges (see strategies indicated in the red triangle in Fig. 3) where players
are willing to help each other learn the unknown state V by revealing their private information.
Fig. 3. Equilibrium strategies for N = 11, p = 0.1, δ = 1. “00”, “01”, and “11” denote strategies 0, I , and 1, respectively.
The last set of figures shows the effect of the quality of information. IN Fig. 4 the equilibrium for the case of
δ = 0.999 and p = 0.4 is depicted. This is a much noisier private observation compared to the one depicted in
Fig. 2. As a result, equilibrium behavior is “softer”: players are willing to wait more and reveal their information,
since a single observation is now of lower quality than before.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We studied a Bayesian learning scenario with non-myopic players. Our scenario generalizes the classic myopic
and sequential one-shot scenario where informational cascades were first reported. In order to analyze information
cascades in this scenario, an intricate analysis of the PBE of the dynamic game was needed. By introducing
structured strategies, we constructed FPEs that can be solved for the PBE in finite time. By further exploiting the
structure of our scenario, we constructed FPEs that have a quadratic dimension in the number of players N and
are easy to interpret. Building on the tractability of these equations, we have proved that they always have at least
one solution and that all solutions have similar properties. In particular, we proved that all the solutions are PBE
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium strategies for N = 11, p = 0.4, δ = 0.999. “00”, “01”, and “11” denote strategies 0, I , and 1, respectively.
where an informational cascade happens. In these informational cascades, only a small portion of the information
has been revealed, with high probability for a large N , making these cascades inefficient. Numerical solutions of
our FPEs show that players exhibit a non-myopic behavior that is much more intricate than in the myopic case
we generalized. This non-myopic behavior, however, does not prevent the ultimate inefficient information cascade.
Our results suggest that informational cascades are general phenomena that are not limited to myopic scenarios.
We conjecture that informational cascade can be shown to happen in many other Bayesian learning scenarios.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Let us assume that all players other than n play according to γ∗t = θ[nt, pit, bt], i.e., a
nt
t = γ
∗
t (x
nt) =
θ[nt, pit, bt](x
nt) for all nt 6= n. Let us further assume that the update of the belief pit is fixed to pit+1 =
F (pit, γ
∗
t , a
nt
t , nt) = F (pit, θ[nt, pit, bt], a
nt
t , nt) =: F
θ(pit, nt, a
nt
t , bt). We will show that the optimization problem
faced by player n can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). For this we will define a state, action, and
instantaneous reward of a dynamical system as follows. The state of the system is defined as st = (xn, nt, pit, bt).
Further, the action space is defined according to equation (7), where at each time t, player n takes the action
ant ∈ An(bnt , nt) and receives an instantaneous reward R(st, ant ) = ant
∑
v vpi(v|xn).
We first show that (st)t is a controlled Markov process with actions ant , i.e.,
P (st+1|s1:t, an1:t) = P (st+1|st, ant ). (35)
Indeed,
P (st+1|s1:t, an1:t) = P (x¯n, nt+1, pit+1, bt+1|xn, n1:t, pi1:t, b1:t, an1:t) (36)
= 1xn(x¯n)
1
N
Qb(bt+1|xn, nt, pit, bt, ant )Qpi(pit+1|xn, nt, pit, bt, ant ), (37)
where
Qb(bt+1|xn, nt, pit, bt, ant ) = Qbn(bnt+1|bnt , ant )
N∏
m=1,m6=n
Qb−n(b
m
t+1|xn, nt, pit, bt) (38a)
Qbn(b
n
t+1 = 1|bnt , ant ) =
 0 , if bnt = 0 and ant = 01 , else (38b)
Qb−n(b
m
t+1 = 1|xn, nt, pit, bt) =

∑
xm pi(x
m|xn)1θ[nt,pit,bt](xm)(1) , if bmt = 0
1 , else
(38c)
Qpi(pit+1|xn, nt, pit, bt, ant ) =

∑
a
nt
t ∈Ant (bntt ,nt)
∑
xnt pi(x
nt |xn)1θ[nt,pit,bt](xnt )(antt )1F θ(pit,nt,antt ,bt)(pit+1)
if nt 6= n
1F θ(pit,nt,ant ,bt)(pit+1) if nt = n
(38d)
Therefore, we have proved (35). Hence, the state (st)t with the reward R(st, ant ) form an infinite horizon MDP
and so the optimal pure strategy can be derived from the following FPE for the state s = (xn, n¯, pi, b),
an∗ = γ∗(xn) = arg max
an∈An(bn,n¯)
[
an
∑
v
vpi(v|xn) + δE [V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an]] , (39a)
where N¯ , Π and B are random variables for the next state elements and the expectation is according to the transition
kernels (38). Furthermore,
V n(xn, n¯, pi, b) = max
an∈An(bn,n¯)
[
an
∑
v
vpi(v|xn) + δE [V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an]] (39b)
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Next, we need to show that FPE (39) is equivalent to FPE 1. We first show that V n(xn, n¯, pi, bn = 1, b−n) = 0 for all
xn, n¯, pi, b−n. According to the action space defined in (7), if bn = 1, An(bn, n¯) = {0}. This means that the instanta-
neous reward at this state is 0. On the other hand, according to the transition kernel of b (38), this state is absorbing in
terms of bn. It means bn = 1 for all future states too. This will cause player n to have 0 rewards in all of the upcoming
states and so V n(xn, n¯, pi, 1, b−n) = 0. Therefore, for n = n¯, FPE (39) is indeed choosing between geting the
instantaneous reward
∑
v vpi(v|xn) (by buying) or δE
[
V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an] (by not buying). According
to the transition kernnels (38), δE
[
V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an] = δN ∑Nn¯′=1 V n (xn, n¯′, F (pi, γ∗, 0, n) , b).
Hence, for n = n¯, FPE (39) is equivalent with (13a) and the first three cases of (13b). Further, for n 6= n¯,
since An(bn, n¯) = {0}, V n(xn, n¯, pi, b) = δE [V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an]. According the transition kernels
(38), δE
[
V n(xn, N¯ ,Π, B)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an] = δN ∑Nn¯′=1 E [V n(xn, n¯′,Π, Bn¯b−n¯)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an]. It is evident from
(38) that Π = F (pi, γ∗, γ∗(X n¯), n¯) and therefore,
V n(xn, n¯, pi, b) =
δ
N
N∑
n¯′=1
E
[
V n(xn, n¯′, F (pi, γ∗, γ∗(X n¯), n¯), Bn¯b−n¯)|xn, n¯, pi, b, an] ,
which is the fourth case of (13b). It is also clear that the transition kernel of Bn¯ is equivalent with (13c) and hence,
the theorem is proved.
May 7, 2019 DRAFT
21
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: We have
Pr (hct |x, v) =
(a)
t−1∏
τ=0
snττ (at′ |xnτ , a0:τ−1) =
N∏
m=1
t−1∏
τ=0,nτ=m
snττ (aτ |xm, a0:τ−1) (40)
where (a) uses the fact that the strategy of each player is a function only of her private history. Hence
Pr (x | v , hct) =
Q (v) Pr (x|v) Pr (hct |x, v)∑
x′ Pr (v, h
c
t , x
′)
(41a)
=
Q (v)
∏N
m=1Q (x
m|v) Pr (hct |x, v)
Q (v)
∑
x′
(∏N
m=1Q (x
′m|v) Pr (hct |x′, v)
) (41b)
=
∏N
m=1Q (x
m|v)∏Nm=1∏t−1τ=0,nτ=m snττ (aτ |xm, a0:τ−1)∑
x′
(∏N
m=1Q (x
′m|v)∏t−1τ=0,nτ=m snττ (at′ |x′m, a0:τ−1)) (41c)
=
N∏
m=1
Q (xm|v)∏t−1τ=0,nτ=m snττ (aτ |xm, a0:τ−1)∑
x′m
(
Q (x′m|v)∏t−1τ=0,nτ=m snττ (aτ |x′m, a0:τ−1)) (41d)
=
N∏
m=1
Pr (xm | v , hct) (41e)
which means that the private information variables {xm} are conditionally independent given v , hct .
Now observe that
Pr (xm | v , hct) = Pr
(
xm | v , hct−1, at, nt+1
)
=
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1, xm
)
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1
) Pr (xm | v , hct−1) (42)
If γt 6= I or m 6= nt, then player m did not reveal her private information in turn t. Hence
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1, xm
)
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1
) = ∑xnt Pr (at | v , hct−1, xm, xnt)Pr (xnt | v , hct−1, xm)
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1
) (43a)
=
∑
xnt Pr
(
at | v , hct−1, xnt
)
Pr
(
xnt | v , hct−1
)
Pr
(
at | v , hct−1
) (43b)
= 1. (43c)
We arrive at the recursive equation
Pr (xn | v , hct) =
{
1x˜nt (x
n) γt = I, nt = n
Pr
(
xn | v , hct−1
)
o.w.
(44)
for which the solution is
Pr (xn | v , hct) =
{
1x˜nt (x
n) x˜nt 6= 0
Q (xn|v) x˜nt = 0
(45)
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If γt 6= I or x˜ntt 6= 0 then pit+1 (1) = pit (1). If instead γt = I and x˜ntt = 0 then the belief on v can be updated as
pit+1 (1) = Pr (V = 1|a0:t, n0:t+1) (46a)
= Pr (V = 1|a0:t, n0:t) (46b)
=
Pr (V = 1, at|a0:t−1, n0:t)
Pr (at|a0:t−1, n0:t) (46c)
=
Pr (at|V = 1, a0:t−1, n0:t) Pr (V = 1|a0:t−1, n0:t)
Pr (at|a0:t−1, n0:t) (46d)
=
Pr (at|V = 1, a0:t−1, n0:t)pit (1)
Pr (at|V = 1, hct)pit (1) + Pr (at|V = −1, hct)pit (−1)
(46e)
=
(a)
p1−at (1− p)at pit (1)
p1−at (1− p)at pit (1) + pat (1− p)1−at (1− pit (1))
(46f)
=
1
1 +
(
1−pit(1)
pit(1)
)(
p
1−p
)2at−1 (46g)
where (a) follows since player nt reveals her private information at turn t, so it must determine her action and
Pr (at | v, hct) =
 p1−at (1− p)
at γt = I , v = 1, x˜
nt
t = 0
pat (1− p)1−at γt = I, v = −1, x˜ntt = 0
(47)
The initial condition for the recursive equation (46g) is pi0 (1) = Pr (v = 1) = 12 . As can be verified by substituting,
the solution is pit (1) = 1
1+( p1−p )
∑
n x˜
n
t
, so the common belief is solely determined by
∑
n x˜
n
t .
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APPENDIX C
COMPUTING A PBE THOUGH A POLYNOMIAL-DIMENSIONAL FPE
Owing to the symmetry of the problem we define the set K = {00,−10, 01,−11,+11} where the elements of
this set are all possible values that the pair x˜ibi can take for each player i. Note that +10 can never happen under
any strategy so it is not included in the set. So players are grouped into 5 groups according to their value of the
pair x˜ibi. We define the joint type (scaled empirical distribution), tx˜b of the sequence (x˜, b) as
tx˜b(k) =
N∑
i=1
1x˜ibi(k), ∀k ∈ K. (48)
Clearly for every type t, t(k) ≥ 0 and ∑k∈K t(k) = N , so there are exactly (N+44 ) ∼ N4 such possible types.
Note that with the above definition, the aggregate state information y =
∑N
i=1 x˜i equals to y = t(+11)−t(−10)−
t(−11).
We define the following functions Ua : X × K × T → R, and U lna : X × K × T → R for all l ∈ K. The
meaning of these functions is as follows. Ua(x, k, t) denotes the value function of the acting player n whose private
information xn = x, her pair x˜nbn = k (and so she belongs to group k) and the joint type of the sequence (x˜, b) is
t. Similarly, U lna(x, k, t) denotes the value function of a non-acting player m whose private information x
m = x,
her pair x˜mbm = l (and so she belongs to group l), with an acting player n whose pair x˜nbn = k (i.e., belonging
to group k), and the joint type of the sequence (x˜, b) is t.
Finally we define the update functions gx, gb, and gt as follows
gx(kx, γ, a) =
 2a− 1 , if kx = 0 and γ = Ikx , else , (49a)
gb(kb, a) =
 a , if kb = 0kb , else , (49b)
gt(k, t, γ, a)(k′) =

t(k′)− 1 , if k′ = k and gxb(k, γ, a) 6= k
t(k′) + 1 , if k′ = gxb(k, γ, a) and gxb(k, γ, a) 6= k
t(k′) , else
, (49c)
where we use the notation k = kxkb to decompose the two parts of the k index, and with the understanding that
we also use the notation gefg to denote (ge, gf , gg) for any e, f, g ∈ {x, b, t}.
We consider the following FP equation in FPE 4.
Fixed-Point Equation 4 (Polynomial dimension). For every k = kxkb ∈ K, t ∈ T we evaluate γ∗ = φ[k, t] as
follows.
• If kb = 1 then γ∗ = 0.
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• If kb = 0 then γ∗ is the solution of the following system of equations
γ∗(x) = arg max{ A︸︷︷︸
0=don’t buy
,
qy+x10(kx) − 1
qy+x10(kx) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=buy
} ∀x ∈ X , where (50a)
A =
δ
N
Ua(x, g
xbt(k, t, γ∗, 0)) +
δ
N
∑
k′∈K
[t(k′)− 1k(k′)]Ugxb(k,γ∗,0)na (x, k′, gt(k, t, γ∗, 0))] (50b)
where the value functions satisfy
Ua(x, k, t) =

0, if kb = 1
A, if kb = 0, γ∗(x) = 0
qy+x10(kx)−1
qy+x10(kx)+1
, if kb = 0, γ∗(x) = 1
, (50c)
and for all l = lxlb ∈ K
U lna(x, k, t) =

0, if lb = 1,
δ
NE[Ua(x, l, g
t(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]
+ δNE[U
l
na(x, g
xbt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]
+ δN
∑
k′∈K[t(k
′)− 1k(k′)− 1l(k′)]E[U lna(x, k′, gt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))], if lb = 0,
,
(50d)
where expectation in the last equation is wrt the RV Xn where
P (Xn = xn|l, x, k, t) =
 1kx(xn) , if kx 6= 0Q(xn|−1)+Q(xn|1)qy+x10(lx)
qy+x10(lx)+1
, else.
(50e)

We will now show that if the last FP equation has a solution U∗, then the original FP equation has a solution
V ∗ where V ∗ can be readily derived from U∗.
Given the solution U∗ of the above FP equation (together with the strategy φ) we construct the following strategies
and value functions.
γ∗ = θ[n, x˜, b] = φ[x˜nbn, tx˜,b] (51a)
V˜ m(·, n, x˜, b) =
 Ua(·, x˜nbn, tx˜,b), if m = nU x˜mbmna (·, x˜nbn, tx˜,b), if m 6= n . (51b)
We will show that these value functions are solutions of the original FPE 2.
Theorem 7. The value functions (V˜ m)m∈N together with the strategy mapping γ∗ = φ[·] satisfy FPE 2.
Proof: Fix n, x˜, and b that result in a type t with accumulated state y. The active player n belongs to a group
k = kxkb = x˜
nbn. If bn = 1 then kb = 1 and γ∗ = 0. If bn = 0 then it is clear that the second term in (21a)
becomes q
y+xn10(kx)−1
qy+x
n10(kx)+1
, which is exactly the same as the second term in (50b) (with xn = x). Consider the first
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term in (21a). The new group of the active player n is kˆ = f(x˜n, γ∗, 0)0 = gxb(k, γ∗, 0) and the new value for the
overall type will change to tˆ = gt(k, t, γ∗, 0). The implication of the above is that the first term in (21a) will be
N∑
n′=1
V˜ n(xn, n′, x˜−nf(x˜n, γ∗, 0), b−n0)
= V˜ n(xn, n, x˜−nf(x˜n, γ∗, 0), b−n0) +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n
V˜ n(xn, n′, x˜−nf(x˜n, γ∗, 0), b−n0) (52a)
= Ua(x
n, kˆ, tˆ) +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n
U kˆna(x
n, x˜n
′
bn
′
, tˆ) (52b)
= Ua(x
n, kˆ, tˆ) +
∑
k′∈K
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,x˜n′bn′=k′
U kˆna(x
n, x˜n
′
bn
′
, tˆ) (52c)
= Ua(x
n, gxbt(k, t, γ∗, 0)) +
∑
k′∈K
[t(k′)− 1k(k′)]Ugxb(k,γ∗,0)na (xn, k′, gt(k, t, γ∗, 0)), (52d)
where the term t(k′)− 1k(k′) enumerates all players n′ 6= n in the vector x˜−nf(x˜n, γ∗, 0), b−n0 which are given
by the original type t subtracting one from the group of the active player. This is exactly the expression in (50b)
and thus (21a) is satisfied.
Now consider (21b). Fix m and denote the group of the m-th player by l = lxlb = x˜mbm. The first three branches
of this equation are obviously satisfied. Regarding the fourth branch we know that the new group of the active player
n will be Kˆ = f(x˜n, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)), B′n = gb(kb, γ∗(Xn)) and the new type will be Tˆ = gt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)). The
left-hand side of (21b) becomes U lna(x
m, k, t) with lb = 0. The right-hand side becomes
N∑
n′=1
E
[
V m
(
xm, n′, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
(53a)
=E
[
V m
(
xm,m, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
+ E
[
V m
(
xm, n, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
+
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=m,n
E
[
V m
(
xm, n′, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
(53b)
=E[Ua(xm, l, Tˆ )] + E[U lna(xm, Kˆ, Tˆ )] +
∑
k′∈K
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,m, x˜n′bn′=k′
E[U lna(xm, x˜n
′
bn
′
, Tˆ )] (53c)
=E[Ua(xm, l, gt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))] + E[U lna(xm, gxbt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]+∑
k′∈K
[t(k′)− 1k(k′)− 1l(k′)]E[U lna(xm, k′, gt(k, t, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]. (53d)
This is exactly the expression in (50d) and thus (21b) is satisfied.
We remark at this point that this method can be generalized for heterogenous players with different values of δ.
All is needed is to consider joint types of the vectors x˜, b, δ. The corresponding dimensionality of the FP equation
will be ∼ N4Kδ where Kδ is the number of different types of δ.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Fix n, x˜ that results in population parameters y and w. The active player n has parameter r = |x˜n|. It is
clear that the second term in (21a) becomes q
y+xn10(r)−1
qy+x
n10(r)+1
, which is exactly the same as the second term in (27a) (with
xn = x). Consider the first term in (21a). The new parameter of the active player n is rˆ = |f(x˜n, γ∗, 0)| = Gr(r, γ∗)
and the new values for the population parameters are (yˆ, wˆ) = Gyw (r, y, w, γ∗, 0). The implication of the above
is that the first term in (21a) will be
N∑
n′=1
V˜ n
(
xn, n′, x˜−nf(x˜n, γ∗, 0), b−n0
)
(54a)
= V˜ n
(
xn, n, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, 0) , b−n0
)
+
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n
V˜ n
(
xn, n′, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, 0) , b−n0
)
(54b)
= Ua (x
n, rˆ, yˆ, wˆ) +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n
U rˆna
(
xn, zn
′
, yˆ, wˆ
)
(54c)
= Ua (x
n, rˆ, yˆ, wˆ) +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,zn′=0
U rˆna (x
n, 0, yˆ, wˆ) +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,zn′=1
U rˆna (x
n, 1, yˆ, wˆ) (54d)
= Ua (x
n, rˆ, yˆ, wˆ) + (N − w − 1 + r)U rˆna (xn, 0, yˆ, wˆ) + (w − r)U rˆna (xn, 1, yˆ, wˆ) (54e)
= Ua (x
n, Gryw(r, y, w, γ∗, 0))
+ (N − w − 1 + r)UGr(r,γ∗)na (xn, 0, Gyw(r, y, w, γ∗, 0))
+ (w − r)UGr(r,γ∗)na (xn, 1, Gyw(r, y, w, γ∗, 0)) . (54f)
This is exactly the expression in (27a) and thus (21a) is satisfied.
Now consider (21b). Fix m and denote the parameter of the m-th player by r˜ = |x˜m|. The first three branches of
this equation are obviously satisfied. Regarding the fourth branch we know that the new parameter of the active player
n will be Zˆ = Gz(z, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)) and the new population parameters will be (Yˆ , Wˆ ) = Gyw(z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)).
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The left-hand side of (21b) becomes U r˜na(x
m, z, y, w). The right-hand side becomes
N∑
n′=1
E
[
V m
(
xm, n′, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
(55a)
=E
[
V m
(
xm,m, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
+ E
[
V m
(
xm, n, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
+
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=m,n
E
[
V m
(
xm, n′, x˜−nf (x˜n, γ∗, γ∗ (Xn)) , b−nB′n
)]
(55b)
=E[Ua(xm, r˜, Yˆ , Wˆ )] + E[U r˜na(xm, Zˆ, Yˆ , Wˆ )]+
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,m, zn′=1
E[U r˜na(xm, 1, Yˆ , Wˆ )] +
N∑
n′=1,n′ 6=n,m, zn′=0
E[U r˜na(xm, 0, Yˆ , Wˆ )] (55c)
=E[Ua(xm, r˜, Gyw(z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))] + E[U r˜na(xm, Gzyw(z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]+
(w − z − r˜)E[U r˜na(xm, 1, Gyw(z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]+
(N − w − 2 + z + r˜)E[U r˜na(xm, 0, Gyw(z, y, w, γ∗, γ∗(Xn)))]. (55d)
This is exactly the expression in (50d) and thus (21b) is satisfied.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: Throughout this proof, we have dropped the conditions in all of the expectations and assume that all
of them are conditioned on the current state.
In order to prove that the suggested strategy profile is an equilibrium, we show that it satisfies FPE 3. First, we
show that whenever γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0 for both r = 0, 1, the valuation functions are all 0.
A =
δ
N
Ua (x, r, y, w) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1 + z)Urna (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(w − z)Urna (x, 1, y, w) ,
where for both z˜ = 0, 1,
Urna (x, z˜, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua (x, r, y, w) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1 + z)Urna (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(w − z)Urna (x, 1, y, w) .
and since γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0, we should have Ua (x, r, y, w) = A. Therefore, we can solve for Ua (x, r, y, w),
Urna (x, 0, y, w), U
r
na (x, 1, y, w) and A in above equations. It is easy to see that the solution for all of these quantities
is 0 and hence, A = 0. Therefore, Ua (x, r, y, w) = 0 and it is obvious that playing γ∗ = φ[r, y, w] = 0 for y ≤ −1
is an equilibrium, because the instantaneous reward is non-positive and A is 0 so players can choose not buying
over buying.
Then, we show that γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 satisfies FPE 3 for every w, y as long as q
y−1−1
qy−1+1 ≥ 0 and γ∗ =
φ[0, y, w′] = 1 for all w′ > w (which is satisfied in our suggested strategy profile).
By plugging γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 in FPE 3, we have
A =
δ
N
Ua (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1)U0na (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
wU0na (x, 1, y, w) ,
where
U0na (x, 1, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1)U0na (x, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
wU0na (x, 1, y, w)
and
U0na (x, 0, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua (x, 0, y, w + 1) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U0na (x, 0, y, w + 1) +
δ
N
(w + 1)U0na (x, 1, y, w + 1) .
Since γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 and if γ∗ = φ[0, y, w + 1] = 1, we know that Ua (x, 0, y, w) = Ua (x, 0, y, w + 1) =
qy+x−1
qy+x+1 . Therefore, if U
0
na (x, 0, y, w + 1) ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 , we can prove that U
0
na (x, 0, y, w) ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 and consequently,
U0na (x, 1, y, w) ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 which results in A ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 . By writing the above equations for w = N−2, it is obvious
that U0na (x, 0, y,N − 2) ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 . By extending this property backwards, we prove that U
0
na (x, 0, y, w + 1) ≤
qy+x−1
qy+x+1 . Hence, A ≤ q
y+x−1
qy+x+1 . Since
qy−1−1
qy−1+1 ≥ 0, we can prove that for both x = −1,+1,
γ∗(x) = arg max
 A︸︷︷︸0=don’t buy,
qy+x − 1
qy+x + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=buy
 = 1.
Hence, it is optimal for a player with r = 0, y, w to play 1. The same argument for all w′ > w proves that if
qy−1−1
qy−1+1 ≥ 0, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 and γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 1 for w′ > w satisfy FPE 3 and so it is an equilibrium.
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Therefore, since q
y−1−1
qy−1+1 ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 2, the suggested strategy profile is an equilibrium for the corresponding
state variables.
Next, we prove that if γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 and γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 1 for w′ > w, we must have γ∗ = φ[1, y, w] =
1 for δ < 1 and we can have γ∗ = φ[1, y, w] = 1 for δ = 1. For r = 1, y, w and x = −1 (notice that if x = 1,
we must have r = 0, otherwise the player should have already bought the product at the time of revealing and
therefore, b = 1 and γ∗ = φ[r, 1, y, w] = 0) and any γ∗, FPE 3 will be as follows,
A =
δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, y, w) + δ
N
(N − w)U1na (−1, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(w − 1)U1na (−1, 1, y, w) ,
where
U1na (−1, 1, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, y, w) + δ
N
(N − w)U1na (−1, 0, y, w) +
δ
N
(w − 1)U1na (−1, 1, y, w) (56)
and
U1na (−1, 0, y, w) =
δ
N
Ua (−1, 0, y, w + 1) + δ
N
(N − w − 1)U0na (−1, 0, y, w + 1) +
δ
N
wU0na (−1, 1, y, w + 1) .
Similar to r = 0 case, we show that if γ∗ = φ[1, y, w + 1] = 1, U1na (−1, 0, y, w + 1) ≤ q
y−1−1
qy−1+1 and then we can
prove that A ≤ qy−1−1qy−1+1 and hence, by starting from w = N and going backwards, we see that in this situation,
γ∗ = φ[1, y, w′] = 1 is the only equilibrium for all w′ ≥ w and δ < 1 and it can be an equilibrium for all w′ ≥ w
and δ = 1 (there might be other equilibria because of possible ties).
Now we prove that the suggested strategy profile satisfies FPE 3 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. By plugging γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I
in FPE 3 for y = 1, we have
A =
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 0, w + 1) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (x, 0, 0, w + 1) +
δ
N
wU1na (x, 1, 0, w + 1) , (57)
where
U1na (x, 1, 0, w + 1) =
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 0, w + 1) +
δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (x, 0, 0, w + 1) +
δ
N
wU1na (x, 1, 0, w + 1)
(58)
and
U1na (x, 0, 0, w + 1) = E
[
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, Xa, w + 2) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, Xa, w + 2)
+
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, Xa, w + 2)
]
,
where the expectation is w.r.t. Xa, which is the type of the acting player and is either -1 or +1. We can write the
terms inside the expectation for both Xa = 1 and Xa = −1 cases. For Xa = −1,
δ
N
Ua (x, 1,−1, w + 2) + δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0,−1, w + 2) +
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1,−1, w + 2)
Since γ∗ = φ[r,−1, w,−1] = 0, the above terms are all 0 (was proved at the beginning of this proof). The terms
inside expectation in (58) will be as follows for Xa = 1,
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 1, w + 2) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, 1, w + 2) +
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, 1, w + 2) ,
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where
U1na (x, 1, 1, w + 2) =
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 0, 1, w + 2) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, 1, w + 2)
+
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, 1, w + 2)
Since γ∗ = φ[r, 2, w] = 1, for a player with x = 1, if U1na (1, 0, 1, w + 2) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 we can prove U
1
na (1, 1, 1, w + 2) ≤
q2−1
q2+1 and Ua (1, 1, 1, w + 2) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 , which results in the conclusion that the term inside expectation in (58) is
always not more than q
2−1
q2+1 and so U
1
na (1, 0, 0, w + 1) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 . It results in Ua (1, r, 0, w + 1) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 . We can
then conclude that in (57), A ≤ q2−1q2+1 . Therefore, it is optimal for a player with x = 1 to buy the product at y = 1.
Therefore, we only need to show that U1na (1, 0, 1, w + 2) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 ,
U1na (x, 0, 1, w + 2) = E
[
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 1 +Xa, w + 3) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, 1 +Xa, w + 3)
+
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, 1 +Xa, w + 3)
]
(59)
Similarly, we can write the terms inside the expectation for both Xa = 1 and Xa = −1 cases. For Xa = 1,
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 2, w + 3) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, 2, w + 3) +
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, 2, w + 3) ,
Since γ∗ = φ[r, 2, w + 3] = 1, all of the terms in above equation are not more than q
2−1
q2+1 and so the whole term
is not more than q
2−1
q2+1 . For Xa = −1,
δ
N
Ua (x, 1, 0, w + 3) +
δ
N
(N − w − 2)U1na (x, 0, 0, w + 3) +
δ
N
(w + 1)U1na (x, 1, 0, w + 3) ,
By writing the above equation for w = N − 4 and extending the results backward, we can prove that the term
inside the expectation in (59) is not more than q
2−1
q2+1 and so U
1
na (1, w + 2, 1, 0) ≤ q
2−1
q2+1 . Therefore, we can prove
that it is optimal for a player with x = 1 to buy at y = 1 when γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I . Next, we need to prove that it
is optimal for a player with x = −1 not to buy at y = 1 when γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I . Obviously, the instantaneous
reward is 0 and since the valuation functions are non-negative, it can be optimal for a player with x = −1 not to
buy at y = 1. Therefore, we have proved that γ∗ = φ[0, 1, w] = I is an equilibrium.
By writing FPE 3 for y = 0 we have
A =
δ
N
Ua (x, 1,−1, w + 1) + δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (x, 0,−1, w + 1) +
δ
N
wU1na (x, 1,−1, w + 1) ,
where all of above terms are 0 and so it is optimal for a player with x = 1 to buy and for a player with x = −1
not to buy. Therefore, γ∗ = φ[0, 0, w] = I is equilibrium.
The only cases left are for r = 1 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Clearly, at y = 0, the instantaneous reward is 0 and hence, it
can be optimal to wait. For y = 1 and r = 1, notice that FPE 3 should only be solved for x = −1 and it will be
as follows
γ∗(−1) = arg max
 A︸︷︷︸0=don’t buy,
q1 − 1
q1 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1=buy
 ,
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where for all γ∗,
A =
δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, 1, w) + δ
N
(N − w)U1na (−1, 0, 1, w) +
δ
N
(w − 1)U1na (−1, 1, 1, w) ,
and Ua (−1, 1, 1, w) is either A or q
1−1
q1+1 depending on what the equilibrium is. By writing U
1
na (−1, 1, 1, w) in terms
of Ua (−1, 1, 1, w) and U1na (−1, 0, 1, w) according to (56) and plugging once A and once q
1−1
q1+1 for Ua (−1, 1, 1, w)
in the above equation, the value of A can be calculated by knowing the value of U1na (−1, 0, 1, w). On the other
hand, we can calculate the value of U1na (−1, 0, 1, w) by knowing the equilibrium at y = 0 and y = 2 (which we
already know). Hence, there is no fixed point and the value of A will be either less than q
1−1
q1+1 (when we have set
the value of Ua (−1, 1, 1, w) to q
1−1
q1+1 ) and the equilibrium will be γ
∗ = 1, or it will be greater than q
1−1
q1+1 (when
we have set the value of Ua (−1, 1, 1, w) to A) and the equilibrium will be γ∗ = 0. Therefore, a solution always
exists and hence, we finish the proof of existence of such strategy profile as equilibrium of the game.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: Throughout this proof, we have dropped the conditions in all of the expectations and assume that all
of them are conditioned on the current state.
We first mention that for r = 1, since we can not have x = 1 (as mentioned in the proof of Theorem 4), we
consider only the strategies γ∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 1 and we assume that γ∗ = I is not an option for the case of r = 1.
We first prove the fourth part of the theorem. For y ≤ −2, the instantaneous reward is negative for both x = 1 and
x = −1. On the other hand, according to the proof of Theorem 4, the value functions are 0 when γ∗ = φ(r, y, w) =
0. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is not buying for both values of x and so γ∗ = φ(r, y, w) = 0 is the only
solution for y ≤ −2. For y ≥ 0, the instantaneous reward is positive for x = 1 and therefore, γ∗ = φ(0, y, w) = 0
(which results in value functions to be 0) can not be an equilibrium strategy.
The fifth part is obvious due to the fact that at y = 0 the reward is negative for x = −1 and it is positive for
x = 1. Hence, neither γ∗ = φ(0, 0, w) = 0 nor γ∗ = φ(0, 0, w) = 1 can be solution of FPE 3. Therefore, if a
solution exists, which we know it does, we must have γ∗ = φ(0, 0, w) = I .
Now we prove the sixth part. If for some equilibrium strategy and some w, y, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I or γ∗ =
φ[0, y, w] = 1, we can not have γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 0 for w′ 6= w and y 6= −1. The reason is that if for w′ 6= w
and γ∗ = φ[r, y, w′] = 0, the valuation function Ua(x, 0, y, w) = 0 as proved in the proof of Theorem 4. On the
other hand, since γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I or γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1, we know that q
y+1−1
qy+1+1 > 0 for y 6= −1. Hence
the instantaneous reward for a player with x = 1 at r = 0, y, w′ is positive and therefore, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 0
can not be an equilibrium strategy. Hence, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I or γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 can not happen with
γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 0 for the same y. Therefore, it is either γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 0 or either of γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I or
γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 for all w.
The seventh part is evident by using the fourth part. In fact, at y = −1, a player with x = 1, has 0 instantaneous
reward and by buying she gets 0 reward. A player with x = −1 has negative instantaneous reward and she should
not buy. Hence, both γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = I and γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = 0 can be solutions for all w. Further, a player
with r = 1 has negative instantaneous reward and therefore, she should not buy and so γ∗ = φ[1,−1, w] = 0.
The third part is a direct consequence of fourth and seventh parts.
In order to prove part one, we can mention the equilibrium strategy that was suggested in Theorem 4 which is
a threshold strategy w.r.t. w. But by using other parts of this theorem, we can have more understanding of what
the equilibrium strategies’ behavior w.r.t. w is. Part six states that if we have a γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 0 for y 6= −1
and some w, we should have γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 0 for every w′ 6= w. It means they will be threshold strategies
w.r.t. w. On the other hand, as proved in proof of Theorem 4, the strategies such that for any w and any y so that
qy−1−1
qy−1+1 ≥ 0, γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 1 for all w′ ≥ w, can be equilibrium. Considering such strategies, will give us
threshold policies w.r.t. w. Also, according to part seven of this theorem, since both γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = I and
γ∗ = φ[0,−1, w] = 0 can be solutions for y = −1 and all w, we can arrange these strategies such that we have a
threshold strategy w.r.t. w.
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So far, we have suggested ways of construction of threshold strategies w.r.t. w for r = 0. Now we show that
whenever we have a strategy that is a threshold policy w.r.t. w for r = 0, we can have equilibrium threshold strategies
w.r.t. w for r = 1. First, as proved in the proof of Theorem 4, if for any w any y, we have γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 1
for all w′ ≥ w, we should have γ∗ = φ[1, y, w] = 1 for all w′ ≥ w. on the other hand, if γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 0, we
must have γ∗ = φ[1, y, w] = 0 too. Further, assume that γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I . It means that
qy−1 − 1
qy−1 + 1
≤ δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, y − 1, w + 1) + δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (−1, 0, y − 1, w + 1)
+
δ
N
wU1na (−1, 1, y − 1, w + 1) , (60)
On the other hand, if we write the fixed point for x = −1, r = 1, y − 1, w + 1, we have
γ∗(−1) = arg max
{
δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, y − 1, w + 1) + δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (−1, 0, y − 1, w + 1)
+
δ
N
wU1na (−1, 1, y − 1, w + 1) ,
qy−1 − 1
qy−1 + 1
}
. (61)
According to (60), we can say that the solution of the above fixed point can be not buy. Hence, whenever γ∗ =
φ[0, y, w] = I , we can have γ∗ = φ[1, y− 1, w+ 1] = 0. We conclude that for every threshold strategy w.r.t. w for
r = 0, we have a threshold strategy w.r.t. w for r = 1.
Now we restrict our attention to the equilibrium strategies that are threshold policies w.r.t. w and prove other
properties for such strategies. We prove that whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1, then we must have γ∗ = φ[0, y′, w] = 1
for all y′ > y and whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I then we must have γ∗ = φ[0, y′, w] 6= 0 for all y′ > y.
Similar to the arguments in the proof of part 6 of this theorem, whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I , the instantaneous
reward is positive for x = 1 and if we have γ∗ = φ[0, y′, w] = 0, the valuation will be 0 while the instantaneous
reward for y′ is greater than y and so it is positive and hence, we can not have γ∗ = φ[0, y′, w] = 0 as a solution.
In order to prove that whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1, then we must have γ∗ = φ[0, y′, w] = 1 for all y′ > y, we
assume this is not true and hence, we have a case where γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 and γ∗ = φ[0, y + 1, w] = I . In this
case the player with x = −1 at y + 1 is choosing not buying over buying which means that
qy − 1
qy + 1
≤ δ
N
Ua (−1, 1, y, w + 1) + δ
N
(N − w − 1)U1na (−1, 0, y, w + 1) +
δ
N
wU1na (−1, 1, y, w + 1) , (62)
Since γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1, we know that γ∗ = φ[0, y, w+ 1] = 1 and hence, according to the proof of Theorem 4,
Ua (−1, 1, y, w + 1) = q
y−1
qy+1 , U
1
na (−1, 0, y, w + 1) ≤ q
y−1
qy+1 and U
1
na (−1, 1, y, w + 1) ≤ q
y−1
qy+1 which means that
for δ < 1, q
y−1
qy+1 <
qy−1
qy+1 and it is a contradiction. Therefore, the result is proved.
Now for r = 1, consider equation (62) and (61), which imply that whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = I , we can have
γ∗ = φ[1, y − 1, w + 1] = 0 and by choosing not buying over buying in case of a tie, this is the solution. Also,
according to the proof of Theorem 4, whenever γ∗ = φ[0, y, w] = 1 and γ∗ = φ[0, y, w′] = 1 for w′ > w, we
must have γ∗ = φ[1, y, w] = 1. This all means that whenever we have a solution that is a threshold policy w.r.t. y
for r = 0, the solution is also a threshold policy w.r.t. y for r = 1 (of course, by setting the rule of choosing not
buying over buying in case of a tie).
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Proof: If Yt remains constant with probability one for all t′ > t, then it is an informational cascade from
definition since yt sums all the revealed private information. Hence, the absorbing states of Y¯i are informational
cascades. We have shown that some Y¯i = yL ≥ Ymin and Y¯i = yR ≤ Ymax are absorbing. The values of both yL, yR
are independent of N . The transition probabilities of Y¯i are
p+(1−p)qy
qy+1 for moving right and
1−p+pqy
qy+1 for moving
left, so they are also independent of N . We conclude that the distribution (specifically, expectation and variance)
of the absorption time is independent of N . Hence, for large enough N , the probability that the absorption time is
larger than MN vanishes to zero. This absorption time is counted in the number of revealings i. We conclude that
the probability that a cascade occurs before MN revealings occur approaches 1 as N →∞.
Now assume that φ [r, y, w] = 1 implies that φ [r, y, wˆ] = 1 for wˆ > w. Denote the number of turns up to
turn MN where the acting player nt has rnt = 1 or bnt = 1 by R (MN ), which is stochastically dominated by a
binomial distributed variable with p = MNN and MN trials since
Pr (Yt+1 = Yt |wt) = wt
N
≤ MN
N
. (63)
Hence, we get from Theorem A.1.11 in [31] that for all N > 0
Pr
(
R (MN ) ≤ M
2
N
N
+
√
2
)
≤ e−
N
M2
N
+
√
2 N
2
M4
N . (64)
Therefore, we conclude that with high probability, at least MN − 2 of the first turns are of players with zn = 0.
Assume that in turn t < MN − 2 the acting player did not reveal her private information.
• If she waited, then wt+1 = wt and yt+1 = yt. The next player with zn = 0 will also wait since she uses the
same strategy γ∗ = φ [r, y, w].
• If she bought, then wt+1 = wt + 1 and yt+1 = yt. The next acting player with zn = 0 will also buy for
xn = −1, 1 (and not reveal) since wt+1 > wt.
The same argument applies for all subsequent players with zn = 0 , and from definition to players with zn = 1,
so a cascade occurred.
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